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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) sweeps into gross income "all
income from whatever source derived," including, but not limited to,
compensation for services, interest, dividends, rents, and alimony pay-
ments.' Specific statutory exclusions may exempt from gross income
certain items that Congress has determined deserve favorable tax treat-
ment.2 One such exclusion, section 104(a)(2), provides that gross income
1. I.R.C. § 61 (1990).
2. See id. §§ 101-135.
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shall not include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit
or agreement and whether as lump-sums or as periodic payments) on
account of personal injuries or sickness."' Congress enacted section
104(a)(2)'s predecessor in 1918," and in spite of subsequent revolution-
ary tax reform,5 this traditional exclusion remains in the present tax
code. This exclusion relieves a taxpayer who has had the misfortune to
be injured from including any subsequent damage award in gross
3. Id. § 104(a)(2).
4. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (cur-
rent version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1990)). After the inception of the federal income tax in 1913, the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) took the position that damages recovered for personal injury
were taxable income. See Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913); see also
Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 470, 471 n.5 (1957). This deci-
sion prompted Congress to enact § 213(b)(6) of the Internal Revenue Act of 1918, which excluded
from gross income damages received on account of personal injury or sickness. Although the legis-
lative history of the Act of 1918 is silent regarding the congressional intent behind this precursor
to § 104(a)(2), the enactment clarified that Congress did not consider these damages to be taxable
income.
The House Report stated:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or
health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury
or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be
included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts shall not be included
in gross income.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918), reprinted in 94 INTERNAL REVENuE ACTS OF
THE UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, & ADmNisTsmTE DocuMENTs 9-10
(B. Reams, Jr. ed. 1979).
Commentators have offered alternative theories for this omission. One leading commentator
has suggested that Congress did not intend to benefit tort victims, but merely wanted to clarify
whether tort damages were income under the sixteenth amendment. See Nordstrom, Income
Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 212, 222 (1958). Another suggested rationale
is that Congress decided that an injured person had suffered enough and did not need to suffer
further through taxation of any damage award. Blackburn, Taxation of Personal Injury Damages:
Recommendations for Reform, 56 TENN. L. REV. 661, 669 (1989).
The Solicitor of Internal Revenue construed § 213(b)(6) narrowly, ruling that the exclusion for
personal injuries applied only to physical injuries. The Solicitor revoked his position that only
physical injuries were exempt from tax following the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In Eisner the Supreme Court defined income as "the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined." Id. at 207. The Solicitor of Internal Revenue
reasoned that compensation for invasion of a personal right was not gain derived from labor or
capital and, thus, did not meet the Eisner definition of income. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
The Supreme Court expanded its definition of income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955), indicating that all "instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion" would be considered as income to the
taxpayer. Id. at 431. Under this definition of income, all damage awards potentially are includable
in gross income unless specifically exempted by the Code. See I.R.C. § 61. For a discussion of the
income tax treatment of business injury damage receipts, see Blackburn, supra, at 670-72. The
concept of human capital has been used to explain taxation as a whole. See Stephan, Federal
Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REv. 1357 (1984).
5. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); Internal Revenue




Presently, neither the Code nor the related Income Tax Regula-
tions define what constitutes a personal injury for the purposes of ex-
clusion of damages under section 104(a)(2). Because the regulations do
define "damages received" as amounts received through prosecution of
a legal action based on "tort or tort-type rights" or through a settle-
ment agreement,7 the essential requirement f6r exclusion is that the
damages must derive from a tort or tort-type claim against the payor 5
Damages received on account of physical injuries clearly are personal
and excludable from gross income even if lost earnings compose part of
the award,9 and physical trauma is not a prerequisite for the exemption
under section 104(a)(2).10
While the statutory exclusion for personal injury damages has re-
mained static, courts have expanded the definition of what constitutes a
personal injury and have brought within the scope of section 104(a)(2)
certain types of damages whose exclusion from gross income is not jus-
tified by sympathy for personal injury victims. The courts have held
that nonphysical torts such as injury to personal or professional reputa-
tion," employment discrimination,12  abridgment of constitutional
rights,'" and tort-type remedies in contract actions'4 are within the
scope of section 104(a)(2).
Part II of this Note examines the scope and legal background of
section 104(a)(2), discusses its historical application in the punitive
damages, defamation, and civil rights areas, and evaluates the tax con-
sequences of alternative methods of calculating damages awards. Part
III examines the present judicial expansion of section 104(a)(2) with
particular emphasis on the conflict between the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) concerning what constitutes excludable per-
sonal injury damages. Part III also considers the legislative amendment
6. The court in Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 726
(3d Cir. 1976), offered this rationale for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1956). The terms "damages," "personal injury," and "tort or
tort-type rights" imply that Congress intended exclusion under § 104(a)(2) to depend on classifica-
tions under state law. Although federal law determines how rights created under state law will be
taxed, Congress may indicate that a tax will depend on the characterization under state law. Threl-
keld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1306 n.6 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
8. Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 119 (1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982).
9. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 414 (1982) (Wilber, J., dissenting), rev'd, 716
F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50, 51 (holding that settlement proceeds,
including amounts representing lost wages, were excludable in physical injury cases).
10. Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1106 (1983).
11. See infra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 109-47 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 60-87, 148-59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 109-47 and accompanying text.
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to section 104(a)(2) limiting the exclusion of punitive damages. Finally,
Part IV explores a recommendation for future legislative action.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Scope of the Exclusion for Personal Injury Damage Awards
1. Punitive Damages
The Service's position on the taxability of punitive damages in per-
sonal injury cases has fluctuated over time as a series of conflicting rev-
enue rulings reflects. In Revenue Ruling 58-418's the taxpayer received
compensatory and punitive damages in the settlement of a suit for in-
jury to the taxpayer's personal reputation. In accordance with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.16 that
punitive damages are includable in gross income because they represent
punishment for culpable conduct and are not a substitute for any loss
sustained by the taxpayer, the Service held that the punitive damages
received by the taxpayer were includable in gross income.17 Because the
taxpayer's settlement agreement did not allocate portions of the settle-
ment to compensatory and punitive damages, the Service used the tax-
payer's complaint as the best evidence available to determine an
allocation. 8 The Service excluded from gross income the part of the
settlement allocated to compensatory damages and included in gross in-
come the portion allocated to punitive damages.19
The Service subsequently altered its position in Revenue Ruling
75-45. 20 This ruling concerned a decedent who died in the crash of an
airplane owned by his corporate employer. The decedent's estate re-
ceived a payment under the employer's aircraft liability insurance pol-
icy in exchange for the release of all claims against the employer. The
policy included release of all claims under the state's wrongful death
statute, which provided for the payment of punitive damages. 21 The
Service examined the plain language of section 104(a)(2) and held that
any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on account of
personal injury or sickness are excludable from gross income.22 There-
15. 1958-2 C.B. 18.
16. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
17. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
18. Id. at 19. The Service determined the percentages of compensatory and punitive damages
that composed the total amount of damages sought in the taxpayer's complaint and applied these
ratios to the amount of the settlement payment to determine the amounts allocable to compensa-
tory and punitive damages.
19. Id.





fore, the decedent's estate could exclude from gross income all sums
that it received.2" This ruling was inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 54-
418, which had held that punitive damages were taxable income.
On facts essentially the same as in Revenue Ruling 75-45, the Ser-
vice reversed its position in Revenue Ruling 84-108 and adopted its cur-
rent position that all punitive damages are includable in gross income.2
The Service analyzed the facts under the wrongful death statutes of
Virginia and Alabama.2 5 Under the Virginia wrongful death statute, re-
covery is limited to the amount necessary to compensate the survivors
for their actual loss sustained by reason of the wrongful death. No puni-
tive damages are recoverable.26 The Service held that payments made
for the release of claims under the Virginia wrongful death statute are
in lieu of compensatory damages and are excludable from gross income
under section 104(a)(2).
The Alabama wrongful death statute provides exclusively for puni-
tive damages, which are determined based on the liable party's degree
of fault for the wrongful death and not on the basis of actual loss to the
survivors. 8 The Service also determined that payments made for the
release of claims under the Alabama wrongful death statute were in lieu
of punitive damages and relied on Glenshaw Glass in holding that these
payments were includable in gross income.29 Both the Virginia and Ala-
bama taxpayers suffer the same loss of a family member, yet receive
disparate tax treatment based on the label given to damages recovered
under the relevant wrongful death statute.
The courts,30 however, have not followed the Service's position and
have excluded punitive damages from gross income. For example, a fed-
eral district court rejected Revenue Ruling 84-108 in Burford v. United
States,1 holding that amounts received by Burford under the Alabama
23. Id.
24. 1984-2 C.B. 32. In this ruling a decedent was killed when an airplane owned by his corpo-
rate employer crashed, and his survivors were paid under an aircraft liability insurance policy for
the release of any claim for wrongful death.
25. Id. at 33.
26. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (1984).
27. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34.
28. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-391, 6-5-410 (1975).
29. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34. Some courts have argued that Glenshaw Glass does
not support the Service's position. In Glenshaw Glass the taxpayers had received treble damages
for violations of antitrust laws and punitive damages for fraud. 348 U.S. 426, 427 (1955). The
predecessor of § 104(a)(2) was not at issue because the taxpayers had not received damages on
account of personal injuries. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 339 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586
(4th Cir. 1990).
30. See, e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Burford v. United
States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986); Miller, 93 T.C. at 330.
31. 642 F. Supp. at 635. Courts may disregard a revenue ruling if it conflicts with the statute
it supposedly interprets or if it is otherwise unreasonable. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81,
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wrongful death statute were excludable from gross income. The court
stated that it was "neither logical nor realistic" to conclude that wrong-
ful death proceeds are not received on account of personal injury.32 Ala-
bama cases provide evidence that actions for wrongful death are
equivalent to actions for personal injury.33 The court held that because
damages received under the Alabama wrongful death statute are re-
ceived on account of personal injury, the plain language of section
104(a)(2) mandates their exclusion from gross income.3
2. Defamation to Personal and Professional Reputation
Another conflict between the courts and the Service exists in the
context of injury to a taxpayer's reputation. A particularly vexing ques-
tion has been whether damages received in a suit arising from defama-
tory statements affecting professional pursuits are excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2). Initially, the Tax Court distin-
guished injury to personal reputation from injury to professional repu-
tation. In Roemer v. Commissioner35 a credit report defamed an
insurance agent raising questions about his honesty and falsely stating
that he was ignorant in insurance matters. As a result, Roemer was de-
nied certain licenses to sell insurance, which damaged his then existing
business relationships and his ability to attract new clients. In a suit
against the preparer of the credit report, Roemer was awarded damages
that were not allocated expressly between injury to Roemer's personal
reputation and injury to his business reputation.36 The Tax Court held
that although damages for defamation are received in an action based
on tort or tort-type rights, damages for defamation of a taxpayer's pro-
fessional reputation are beyond the scope of section 104(a)(2).37 Be-
cause Roemer failed to show that the award was to compensate for
injury to his personal reputation, the court included the entire award in
Roemer's gross income.38
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that
damage awards should not be differentiated on the basis of whether the
84 (6th Cir. 1988).
32. Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 637.
33. See, e.g., American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935).
Courts have interpreted the Alabama wrongful death statute to prohibit simultaneous recovery for
personal injuries and wrongful death when both injury and death result from the same wrongful
conduct. See, e.g., Simmons v. Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ala. 1979);
see also ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-410, 6-5-440 (1975).
34. Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 638.
35. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
36. 79 T.C. at 403.




defamation affected personal or professional reputation.-9 Because defa-
mation was a personal injury under the applicable state law,40 the court
excluded the entire award from gross income.41 The court stressed that
the nature of an injury, which is the determinative factor for exclusion
under section 104(a)(2), should not be confused with the consequences
of the injury.42 These consequences, such as a loss of future income,
may be considered in the calculation of damages because they may
prove the extent of the injury most persuasively. 43
While the appeal of Roemer was pending, the Tax Court softened
its position on the distinction between personal and professional injury.
In Church v. Commissioner 4 the Attorney General of Arizona, Wade E.
Church, brought a libel suit against a newspaper that had published an
article calling him a communist. The jury awarded damages, but did
not specify the nature of the award.45 The Tax Court found that the
thrust of Church's libel suit was to show that he had suffered public
embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional pain and suffering as a re-
sult of the article.46 Despite the fact that a substantial portion of the
award was intended to compensate Church for the loss of his political
career, the Tax Court held that the entire award was received on ac-
count of personal injuries and, therefore, was excludable from gross in-
come.47 The court found that the jury intended to compensate Church
for the stigma of being labelled a communist and did not intend to
compensate him for injury to his professional reputation.48 The court
rejected the Service's argument that because the article ended Church's
political career, the damages were awarded for injury to his professional
reputation and, thus, taxable under the Tax Court's decision in Roe-
mer. 4 9 The court found it significant that, at trial, Church had focused
on evidence of his personal injuries and did not present evidence con-
cerning his loss of income .5 The court distinguished Roemer on the ba-
39. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
40. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 45 (West 1985). The court looked to state law to determine the
nature of the injury because no federal common law of torts exists, and the Code does not define
personal injury. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
41. The court held that any punitive damages awarded for the personal injury of defamation
also would be excluded under the Service's then current position that all personal injury damages,
whether compensatory or punitive, were excludable from gross income. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700.
42. Id. at 699.
43. Id.
44. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
45. Id. at 1106.
46. Id. at 1108.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1110.
49. Id. at 1108-09.
50. Id. at 1108.
1991] 375
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
sis that the taxpayer in Roemer had not presented much evidence about
how the defamatory credit report affected him personally. 1
In Threlkeld v. Commissioner2 the Tax Court adopted the Ninth
Circuit's rationale in Roemer and stated that it would no longer distin-
guish between personal and professional reputation in determining the
tax consequences of a damage award .5 Although Threlkeld's settlement
had allocated a portion of the damages for injury to his professional
reputation, the court excluded the entire settlement from gross income
because the action had been for malicious prosecution, a personal injury
under state law.5' According to the court, the appropriate question for
determining exclusion under section 104(a)(2) was whether the injury
complained of constituted a "personal injury." 55 The court maintained
that all facts and circumstances should be considered to determine
whether an injury is personal, including the state law characterization
of the claim, allegations in the state court pleadings, the evidence
brought forth at trial, the presence of a written settlement agreement,
and the intent of the payor in making a settlement payment.56
The Service has decided to follow the decision of the Tax Court in
Roemer and will continue to distinguish between injury to personal and
professional reputation to determine exclusion of damages under sec-
tion 104(a)(2). s  The Service will consider the nature of the defamation
to determine whether it is a personal injury, but the characterization of
the claim under state law will not determine the treatment of the dam-
ages under federal income tax law.5 8 If a defamatory statement is di-
51. Id. at 1108-09.
52. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
53. 87 T.C. at 1304-05. Threlkeld had suffered mental distress and injury to his professional
and credit reputation when falsely prosecuted for real estate fraud. He ified a suit for malicious
prosecution and subsequently settled all claims. Id. at 1296. In the context of a settlement, exclu-
sion of the settlement from gross income depends on the nature of the claim that was the actual
basis for the settlement, not the validity of the claim. Id. at 1297. "The proper inquiry is in lieu of
what are the damages awarded." Church, 80 T.C. at 1107.
54. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308. A dissenting judge stated that the majority had "eliminated
the word 'personal' from the description of the injuries for which damages are excludable under
section 104(a)(2)." Id. at 1309 (Simpson, J., dissenting). He reasoned that damages allocated to
injury to the taxpayer's professional reputation were not received on account of personal injury
and, therefore, the clear language of § 104(a)(2) did not permit exclusion of these damages. Id.
(Simpson, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1305.
56. Id. at 1305-06.
57. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
58. The Service has adopted an inconsistent position regarding when it will defer to the char-
acterization of a claim under state law. In Revenue Ruling 84-108 the Service deferred to the state
characterization of punitive damages and included the damages in gross income. In Revenue Rul-
ing 85-143, however, the Service stated that the state characterization of a claim as personal would
not determine the treatment of the damages under federal income tax law. Note, Defining the
Intersection of Tort and Tax Law: Recent Developments Regarding the Exclusion of Personal
[Vol. 44:369376
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rected primarily at a business and causes the taxpayer loss of business
income, the Service will hold that the defamation is not a personal in-
jury, but an injury to business, and will challenge the exclusion of
damages.59
3. Civil Rights Claims
a. Section 1983
Plaintiffs often append a constitutional claim for a violation of per-
sonal rights to an action in hope of excluding from gross income all or
part of an award. The courts have brought within the scope of section
104(a)(2) damages received under section 198360 for the violation of an
individual's constitutional or statutory rights. In Bent v. Commis-
sioner"1 a public high school teacher brought suit against the school
board for firing him in violation of his first amendment rights. Bent did
not report the settlement payment he received in his gross income. The
Service argued to the Tax Court that the settlement payment was in-
cludable in gross income because it represented compensation for
wages. 2 Bent maintained that the abridgement of his first amendment
rights constituted a tort, and the payment, therefore, was excludable
under section 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulations. 3
The Tax Court found that the settlement payment was made on
the basis of the trial court's determination that Bent's right to freedom
of speech had been violated and not to compensate Bent for lost
Injury Damages, 6 VA. TAx. REv. 425, 442-43 (1986).
59. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, 56. Failure to report the receipt of damages that the
Service would include in gross income may have severe consequences to the taxpayer. If a taxpayer
substantially understates the taxpayer's income tax for any taxable year, the Service may impose a
penalty of 25% of the underpayment. See I.R.C. § 6661 (1990).
60. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
61. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), afl'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987). A public high school teacher, termi-
nated from employment for his criticism of the school administrator, sued the school board for
monetary damages and reinstatement in his position. Bent alleged both breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement and infringement of his first amendment right to freedom of speech in violation
of § 1983. 87 T.C. at 240. Bent also alleged that the school board's refusal to grant him a hearing
violated his right to procedural due process, but the trial court found that he had not acquired a
property interest sufficient to require the school board to give him a hearing. Id. at 240-41. The
trial court found that Bent's first amendment rights had been violated and rejected all other
claims. Prior to the determination of damages, the school board settled with Bent in return for the
release of his claims. Id. at 240-42.
62. Id. at 243.
63. Id.
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wages.6 4 The court then analyzed the nature of a section 1983 claim to
determine the tax consequences of the payment. 5 Relying on the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Carey v. Piphus66 that Congress intended
section 1983 to create tort liability and in Wilson v. Garcia67 that the
best characterization of a section 1983 claim is as a personal injury
claim, the court concluded that damages received under a section 1983
claim for violation of first amendment rights are awarded on the basis
of personal injury suffered and are excludable from gross income.6 8 Re-
jecting the Service's argument, the court stated that lost earnings are
an element of the compensatory damages available under section 1983,
and that in the present case lost earnings were an evidentiary factor in
determining the extent of Bent's damages.6"
b. Title VII
The Tax Court addressed the exclusion of damages received under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)70 in Metzger v.
Commissioner.71 In Metzger an associate professor who was denied ten-
ure sued her private college employer, alleging that she was denied ten-
ure on the basis of her sex and national origin. 2 As compensation for
alleged violations of Title VII and sections 1981 and 1983, Metzger
sought back pay, punitive damages, and reinstatement as a tenured
64. Id.
65. Id. at 246-51.
66. 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978).
67. 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985).
68. Bent, 87 T.C. at 249.
69. Id. at 250-51. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court, characterizing
the mental pain and suffering caused by the denial of a civil right as a personal injury. 835 F.2d 67,
70 (3d Cir. 1987). Rejecting the Service's claim that the amount of the settlement representing lost
wages was not excludable, the court stated, "The amount of his lost wages may be used in comput-
ing the amount of damages awarded for the constitutional violation even though an award based
directly on the claim of lost wages has been rejected by the court." Id. This result is consistent
with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), that
the nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury are excludable from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2).
70. Title VII provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988),
71. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
72. 88 T.C. at 840-41.
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professor.73 In return for the release of all pending claims, the college
made a settlement payment of $75,000. For tax purposes the settlement
agreement allocated the settlement payment one half to wage claims
and one half to all other claims. 4 After Metzger reported $37,500 as
income the Service assessed a deficiency, contending that the entire set-
tlement payment should have been included in Metzger's gross income
because no amount was paid on account of personal injuries.75
Based on its opinion in Bent v. Commissioner,"6 the Tax Court
concluded that damages received under Metzger's section 1983 claim
were paid on account of personal injury and excludable from gross in-
come.7 The court held that because claims brought under section 1981
are tort claims brought to redress personal injuries, any damages
awarded under this claim would be excludable from gross income. 8 The
court next compared Metzger's Title VII claim to a claim for a section
1981 violation and concluded that the conduct prohibited by and the
injuries resulting from violations of both statutes are fundamentally the
same. 9 The court found that the injuries for which Metzger sought re-
lief under Title VII were as much personal injuries as those for which
she sought relief under section 1981.50 Although in Hodge v. Commis-
sioner8 l the court had held that back pay awarded under Title VII was
includable in gross income, the Metzger court concluded that Hodge
does not stand for the proposition that all damages received under Title
73. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the Unites States shall have the same right... to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens ...
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). Metzger also claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, 2000e;
29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and Exec. Order No. 11,246, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375. Metzger,
88 T.C. at 841.
74. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 842.
75. Id. at 846.
76. 87 T.C. at 236; see also supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
77. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 851.
78. Id. at 852-53.
79. Id. at 856.
80. Id.
81. 64 T.C. 616 (1975). In Hodge truck drivers sued their employer claiming they were denied
job promotions because of their race. The drivers sought back pay based on the difference between
their present salaries and the higher salaries they would have received had they been promoted.
The drivers did not claim damages for personal injury. Id. at 617. Under the parties' settlement
agreement, the amount of the settlement proceeds was based solely on the salary differential set
forth in the drivers' complaint. Id. at 618. In the Tax Court proceedings, Hodge contended that
the purpose of Title VII is to assure recovery for the personal injuries associated with job discrimi-
nation and that his settlement payment was excludable regardless of the designation as back pay
in the settlement agreement. The Tax Court found no support for the argument that Title VII is
in reality a recovery for a personal injury and held that back pay recoverable under Title VII is
taxable in the year in which the wages were due. Id. at 618-19.
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VII are taxable.82 The court stated that any possible exclusion of Title
VII damages under section 104(a)(2) would depend on the nature of the
injury complained of and whether back pay actually is awarded or sim-
ply is "the best measure of loss" in determining damages for a violation
of Title VII.8s The court held that at least one-half of the damages re-
ceived by Metzger were for personal injuries and, therefore, excludable
from gross income under section 104(a)(2)." Because Metzger sought to
exclude from gross income only one-half of her settlement payment, the
court did not reach the issue of whether any portion of the settlement
allocated to wage-related claims was excludable from gross income.8 5
Because damages awarded under section 1981 are excludable from
gross income, whereas the excludability of damages awarded under Ti-
tle VII is uncertain, Metzger suggests that a tax conscious plaintiff
should seek redress under section 1981 rather than bring a claim under
Title VII. This strategy violates the general rule of taxation that it is
the substance of the claim-the underlying injury-and not its form
that will determine the claim's tax treatment. 6 In addition, the possible
exclusion of damages received in lieu of wages and the exclusion of
damages calculated on the basis of lost future earnings conflict with the
general principle that earnings are subject to income tax. The formula
used in calculating damages may overcome this tension.
B. Jury Calculation of Damage Awards Based on Lost Earnings
At the section 104(a)(2) intersection of tax and tort law, alternative
methods are available to calculate damages based on lost earnings de-
pending on whether the policies behind tax or tort law prevail. The
formula for computing damages can be based on future pretax gross
earnings or on net earnings, which are gross earnings minus the income
taxes paid on these earnings. The proponents of a net earnings ap-
proach suggest that using net earnings in the calculation of a tax-ex-
empt award effectuates the goals of the tort system.8 8 Because the
purpose of compensatory damages is to place the tort victim in the po-
sition in which the tort victim would have been absent injury, compen-
satory damages should reflect what the injured party actually has lost.8
Had the tort victim not been injured, it would have been net earnings,




86. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
87. See I.R.C. § 61 (1990).
88. See Nordstrom, supra note 4, at 219.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1977).
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not gross earnings, that would contribute to the tort victim's support.90
The use of a gross earnings approach would provide a windfall to the
tort victim by replacing both net earnings and the taxes that the tort
victim no longer needs to pay because the award is tax-exempt.9 1 The
Supreme Court adopted a net earnings approach in Norfolk & Western
Railway v. Liepelt.92
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Liepelt, the majority of
states compute damages for lost earning capacity on a gross earnings
basis.93 In support of the gross earnings approach, it has been argued
that future income tax liability is too speculative and a net earnings
calculation too confusing for the average juror.94 Many variables may
affect future income tax liability, including changes in the tax law, the
taxpayer's family status, and the availability of deductions under the
Code.95 Even though the calculation of net earnings is complex, a jury
already must speculate on an injured party's future employment, work-
life expectancy, future interest rates, and inflation to calculate a dam-
age award, and courts have developed methods of presenting this evi-
dence in a form that a jury can understand.9 Moreover, expert
testimony on the calculation of personal injury damages using net earn-
ings could reduce jury confusion.97 Introduction of this evidence, how-
ever, may result in greater litigation costs and longer trials.9 8
90. See Nordstrom, supra note 4, at 219.
91. Id.
92. 444 U.S. 490 (1980). The Supreme Court suggested that a net earnings calculation may
be inappropriate when the impact of future income taxes would be de minimus and may be more
confusing than probative. Id. at 494-95 n.7.
93. See Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages
in Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4th 589 (1982).
Because the Supreme Court decided Liepelt under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the
Court's holding on calculation of damage awards is not binding on state courts when federal law is
not a basis for the decision. Comment, Income Taxation and the Calculation of Tort Damage
Awards: The Ramifications of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt, 38 WASH. & Lax L. REv. 289
(1981). Liepelt will control the calculation of damages under the Death on the High Seas Act, the
Jones Act, and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Comment, supra, at 300-01.
94. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 870 (1960). For a numerical example showing a net earnings calculation of a damage
award, see Mayor & Hepburn, The Treatment of Income Taxes in Determining Personal Injury
Awards, 18 JURimERaics J. 186, 204-05 (1977).
95. Determination of a taxpayer's future income tax liability became less speculative with the
flattening of the tax rate schedule by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Prior to 1986, it was more
difficult to determine the rate at which a taxpayer's earnings would be taxed, especially when the
amount of income from outside sources was uncertain. Compare Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096 (1986) with Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-
591, § 1, 68 Stat. 730 (1954).
96. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494. For example, juries presently use annuity and life expectancy
tables in making these evaluations. Nordstrom, supra note 4, at 228.
97. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494.
98. Comment, supra note 93, at 294-95.
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In addition, proponents of calculating personal injury awards on a
gross earnings approach reason that by not taxing these awards, Con-
gress has bestowed a humanitarian benefit on tort victims.9 9 Advocates
of the gross earnings basis argue that by decreasing an award under the
net earnings approach, a jury appropriates for the tortfeasor some of
the benefit intended for the tort victim, thus frustrating congressional
intent. 100 One commentator has suggested that an after-tax calculation
benefits employer defendants in suits for back pay because the employ-
ers will pay a smaller amount in damages than they would have paid in
wages. 10' Thus, the net earnings approach may give employer defen-
dants an incentive to undervalue the consequences of committing
torts.1°2
A second issue concerning the calculation of personal injury dam-
ages is whether a court may refuse to give a requested jury instruction
informing the jury that a personal injury award is exempt from tax.
Defendants request these instructions to prevent juries from inflating
awards under the erroneous belief that such awards are taxable.103 The
average juror may be unaware of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion and
may increase a personal injury award to ensure that the injured party is
fully compensated.10 The Supreme Court in Liepelt found that a judge
should give the requested jury instruction when the instruction is not
complicated or prejudicial to either party and would eliminate an area
of speculation that might have an improper effect on the calculation of
damages.105
The majority of states, however, have held that income tax conse-
quences should not be presented to the jury either during the trial or in
a jury instruction. °1 In not giving an instruction, a court assumes that a
jury will not go beyond its specific instructions and will not consider
taxes.0 7 Some judges may instruct the jury that because no evidence is
before them relating to taxes, they should not consider taxes in their
calculation of a damage award. 0 8 This type of instruction, however, ac-
tually may remind the jury about taxes and lead the jury to adjust the
99. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 498-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. J. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INcoME TAX THEORY AND POLICY 113 (1989).
102. Id.
103. Nordstrom, supra note 4, at 213-14.
104. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 497.
105. Id. at 498.
106. See generally Annotation, supra note 93.
107. Comment, supra note 93, at 293 n.37.
108. See, e.g., Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 380 Mass. 362, 370, 403 N.E.2d 402, 408
(1980) (stating that it was sufficient to tell the jury that because no evidence has been presented





A. Judicial Expansion of the Personal Injury Exclusion
1. Employment Discrimination
In Byrne v. Commissioner109 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) filed an action alleging that Grammer, Dempsey &
Hudson, Inc. (Grammer) had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)110 by discriminating against employees who participated in an
EEOC investigation. The EEOC sought to enjoin Grammer from intimi-
dating and discouraging other employees from participating in the in-
vestigation and asked the court to order Grammer to reinstate Byrne.""'
In settlement negotiations between the EEOC and Grammer, Grammer
refused to reinstate Byrne and suggested a lump-sum payment in lieu
of reinstatement. 1 2 Byrne received a $20,000 settlement payment in re-
turn for a release of all claims against Grammer, including all claims
that might arise out of the EEOC proceeding against Grammer. 113 After
Byrne did not include the settlement payment as income on her income
tax return, the Service assessed a deficiency. The Service argued that
because Byrne never had asserted a claim against Grammer, the settle-
ment did not fall within the scope of section 104(a)(2).14
The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument, noting that the set-
tlement payment included consideration for the release of all Byrne's
potential claims against Grammer.1 15 To determine whether the settle-
ment qualified for exclusion under section 104(a)(2), the court focused
on the nature of Byrne's potential FLSA claim against Grammer.1 '
109. 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989). The petitioner worked as a
billing clerk for Grammer, Dempsey & Hudson, Inc. (Grammer). After 12 years of service with
Grammer, Byrne's employment was terminated when Grammer suspected her of informing the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of a disparity in wages paid to males and
females. The EEOC concluded that Byrne's discharge was intended to discourage other employees
from participating in the EEOC's investigation. 90 T.C. at 1001-02.
110. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
111. Byrne, 90 T.C. at 1002.
112. Id. at 1004.
113. Id. at 1004-05.
114. Id. at 1005.
115. Id. at 1006.
116. The EEOC charged that Grammer willfully violated § 215(a)(3) of the FLSA, which
provides in relevant part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person-to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has... testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding [under or related to the Fair Labor Standards Act]." 29 U.S.C. §
215(a)(3) (1988). An employer in violation of § 215(a)(3) "shall be liable for such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this Title, including
without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an
1991] 383
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The court analogized the FLSA claim to the New Jersey state law cause
of action for wrongful discharge, which may be pursued as either a con-
tract or tort claim,11 7 and characterized the FLSA claim as containing
elements of both contract and tort claims.'" The court found that
Byrne's release was sufficiently broad to encompass both tort and con-
tract claims and allocated the settlement payment between them."19
The court estimated that fifty percent of the claims were tort-like and
held, therefore, that one-half of the settlement payment was excludable
from gross income as damages received on account Of personal
injuries.12 0
On appeal, the Third Circuit determined that under the FLSA, an
employer owes a duty to an employee not to discriminate, which is in-
dependent of any contractual agreement. 2' The court further found
that Byrne's state law claim for wrongful discharge was comparable to a
claim for a FLSA violation; therefore, it constituted recovery for per-
sonal injury rather than for economic loss.'22 Recognizing that economic
losses may be the best measure of personal injury damages, the court
followed its Bent rationale and rejected the Service's argument that be-
cause Byrne's settlement was intended to compensate her for economic
losses, it was intended only as compensation for nonpersonal injuries. 123
The court excluded Byrne's entire settlement payment from gross in-
come." This decision provides authority for extending the section
104(a)(2) exclusion to damages awarded in state contract actions that
provide tort-like remedies. 25
The Tax Court maintained its more conservative position on con-
tract-like claims in considering damages awarded under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 28  In Rickel v.
Commissioner 1 27 Rickel filed suit against Marlsbary Manufacturing Co.
additional equal amount as liquidated damages." Id. § 216(b).
117. Under New Jersey law, an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when
the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
118. Byrne, 90 T.C. at 1009.
119. Id. at 1011.
120. Id. Damages for breach of contract are not within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). See
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1990).
121. 883 F.2d 211, 215 (3d Cir. 1989).
122. Id. at 216.
123. Id. at 214.
124. Id. at 216.
125. ABA, Comments Concerning § 11641 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Amending § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 18, 1989), reprinted in Members Argue
Against Exclusions for Punitive Damages and Lost Income Under Section 104, in TAX NOTES
TODAY (Nov. 9, 1989) [hereinafter ABA Comments].
126. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
127. 92 T.C. 510 (1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990). The
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(Marlsbary) alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, 128
and requesting back wages, an equal sum as liquidated damages, and
any further relief that was proper under the circumstances.129 At trial
the jury found that age was a determinative factor in Marlsbary's deci-
sions not to promote Rickel and to terminate his employment. 130 Prior
to a determination of damages, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement that did not allocate the proceeds among the damage claims
that Rickel had asserted.'' Rickel did not include the settlement pro-
ceeds in his gross income. The Service contended that these amounts
were includable because the payments were in the nature of damages
for breach of an employment contract and because the ADEA does not
create a tort action. 13 2 Rickel maintained that the payments were re-
ceived in settlement of an age discrimination claim for wrongful dis-
charge, a tort-type injury, and thus, were excludable from his gross
income. 3 3
The Tax Court determined that the ADEA, like the FLSA,134 con-
tains elements of both tort and contract claims.' 5 The ADEA provides
for damages in lieu of wages in the nature of a breach of contract ac-
tion, and an equal amount of liquidated damages, which resembles a
tort recovery.' The court reasoned that by specifying an amount of
liquidated damages, Congress, through the ADEA, is attempting to
compensate individuals for tort or tort-like injuries caused by their em-
ployers' willfully discriminatory conduct. 3 7 The court held that the liq-
uidated damages which Rickel received under the ADEA were received
on account of personal injuries and exempt from tax under section
petitioner was hired as general sales manager of Marlsbary Manufacturing Co. (Marlsbary) and
was told he would be considered for the presidency of Marlsbary when the position became availa-
ble. When Rickel was 59 years old the company presidency became available, but Marlsbary se-
lected a younger individual to fill the position. Rickel was told that he was not given the
presidency because Marlsbary wanted a younger person in the position, and Rickel's employment
subsequently was terminated. 92 T.C. at 512.
128. Id. The ADEA applies to individuals who are-at least 40 years old. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
The ADEA provides, "It shall be unlawful for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id. §
623(a)(1).
129. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 512-13. Courts are to enforce rights created by the ADEA with FLSA
remedies. Liquidated damages are available only if the defendant willfully violated the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 626(b).
130. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 513.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 520.
133. Id. at 515.
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988); see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
135. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 521.
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 626.
137. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 522.
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104(a)(2). 18 Since the settlement agreement did not specify the amount
of liquidated damages that Rickel had received, the court allocated the
settlement. 189 Because the ADEA equates the amounts recoverable for
wage-related and liquidated damage claims, the court inferred that fifty
percent of the amount paid to Rickel was liquidated damages and ex-
cludable from gross income. 40
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the entire settlement was
excludable from gross income.14 ' The court applied its analysis of the
FLSA in Byrne to Rickel's age discrimination claim under the ADEA. 142
The court found that the duty of an employer to refrain from discrimi-
nating on the basis of age arises by operation of the ADEA and exists
even in the absence of a written employment contract. 43 The court
found that the Tax Court failed to consider properly that the nature of
the claim, not the consequences resulting from the injury, determines
whether damages paid were received on account of personal injuries."4
The court stressed, as it did in Byrne, that the economic effects of an
employer's discrimination do not transform the tort-like injury into a
nonpersonal injury.1  Because Marlsbary's discriminatory actions in-
vaded Rickel's personal rights, the court found that all damages Rickel
received were paid for a personal injury and were excludable under sec-
tion 104(a) (2).146
The Tax Court has yet to decide further cases addressing the issue
of exclusion of damages awarded for a contract-like claim, and it is un-
clear whether the Tax Court will adopt the Third Circuit's expansive
application of section 104(a)(2) or will continue to differentiate wage-
related and tort-like damages. Under present law, the analysis of the
Tax Court is proper. Damages for economic injuries received in lieu of
earnings should be included in gross income and taxed as if they had
been earned. No public policy justification exists for exempting tort vic-
tims from income tax. Damages have replaced their earnings, and they
should pay income taxes on those earnings as do all other taxpayers. In
cases awarding damages for lost wages, a plaintiff recovering for em-
ployment discrimination is in a better position, in terms of federal in-
come tax liability, than if the discrimination never had occurred.




141. 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990).
142. Id. at 662.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 661-62.
145. Id. at 662.
146. Id. at 663-64.
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bly do not merit more humanitarian benefit through exclusion from in-
come tax than any other taxpayers who must pay taxes on their
earnings. 147
2. Civil Rights Claims
In Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Districtl4a the Fifth
Circuit examined the difference in tax treatment between wage-related
damages awarded under Title VII and tort-like damages awarded under
section 1983. Johnston had filed an action against the Harris County
Flood Control District (HFCD), alleging violations of Title VII and
abridgement of his first amendment rights in violation of section
1983.149 The district court held HFCD liable under both statutes.150 The
court fixed Johnston's actual damages for lost wages and employment
and pension benefits under section 1983 at $142,071.151 The court also
fixed recovery under Title VII at the same amount. 52 Because Johnston
was entitled to only one recovery, the court entered a judgment against
HFCD for $142,071 for all claims.153
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that a remedy
could be granted under both Title VII and section 1983, but remanded
to the district court to clarify whether the damage award constituted a
personal injury award under section 1983 or a back pay award under
Title VII.'" According to the court, clarification was necessary because
damages received under section 1983 are paid on account of personal
injury and are excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2)
even if lost earnings were considered in the calculation of the award,
but back pay awarded under Title VII is clearly taxable income.155 The
147. See Chapman, No Pain-No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax
Exempt Status?, 9 U. AR. LrrLE ROCK L.J. 407, 428 (1986-1987).
148. 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 718 (1990). Johnston had testified
against his employer, the Harris County Flood Control District (HFCD), at an Equal Employment
Opportunity hearing. HFCD reacted with a series of retaliatory actions against Johnston, culmi-
nating in the termination of his employment. Id. at 1568.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1579.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court explored the relationship between Title VII and § 1983. Section 1983
provides a remedy for statutory and constitutional violations and does not create any substantive
rights. While Title VII does create statutory rights that are secured by § 1983, § 1983 is not an
available remedy for a violation of Title VII. When a statute itself provides the exclusive remedy
for a violation of its terms as does Title VII, § 1983 is not an available remedy. A litigant must
have an independent basis other than a violation of Title VII to bring claims both under Title VII
and § 1983. Because Johnston alleged a violation of his first amendment rights, he was entitled to
seek redress under both Title VII and § 1983. Id. at 1574-76.
155. Id. at 1580.
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Fifth Circuit instructed the district court that the calculation of dam-
ages should reflect whether the amount awarded could be subject to
tax. 156
For damages awarded under section 1983, the Fifth Circuit advo-
cated a net earnings calculation. 157 This approach would account for tax
liability on the earnings replaced by the damage award and would re-
flect Johnston's actual loss. 15 Thus, if the district court's award was for
back pay under Title VII the district court should calculate it without
reduction for tax liability because the award is subject to tax.159 By rec-
ommending a net earnings calculation for excludable damages and a
gross earnings calculation for damages that must be included in gross
income, the Fifth Circuit accomplished the concurrent goals of taxpayer
equity and compensation for tort victims. A tax-exempt award of net
earnings compensates the tort victim for actual losses. Back pay recov-
ered under Title VII will be subject to tax, leaving net earnings once
taxes have been paid. Courts that award damages based solely on gross
earnings do not afford this equitable tax treatment; thus, all courts
should adopt the Fifth Circuit's method of damage computation.
3. Punitive Damages
The Tax Court recently held that the plain language of section
104(a)(2) does not permit a distinction between punitive and compensa-
tory damages. In Miller v. Commissioner160 Miller alleged that her em-
ployer had accused her of embezzlement in order to conceal a bribery
scheme and had attempted to defame her so that her testimony at trial
would be less credible.' 6' Miller released all claims in return for a settle-
ment payment that did not allocate the settlement proceeds between
compensatory and punitive damages. 6 2 Because the settlement satisfied
claims for defamation, a personal injury under state law, the Tax Court
excluded the entire settlement from gross income.1 63 In determining
that punitive damages are excludable, the court stated that punitive





160. 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
161. 93 T.C. at 331, 333.
162. Id. at 334.
163. Id. at 335. Compensatory damages awarded for injury to personal reputation clearly
were excludable from gross income under prior precedent. See supra notes 44-51 and accompany-
ing text. The court declined to revert to its position in Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398
(1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), that injury to personal reputation should be distin-
guished from injury to professional reputation. Miller, 93 T.C. at 337.
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conduct.164 Without the invasion of personal rights, punitive damages
would be unavailable regardless of a defendant's egregious conduct.165
Because the award of punitive damages is predicated on the existence
of a personal injury, the court maintained that punitive damages are
received on account of personal injury and are excludable from gross
income.'66 By recognizing that all damages arising from a personal in-
jury, whether compensatory or punitive, are excludable under section
104(a)(2), the court attempted to avoid the disparity that may result if
an identical injury is characterized differently under various state
laws.16 7
In reversing the decision of the Tax Court, the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the nature of punitive damages under the applicable state
law.16 8 Under Maryland law, punitive damages awarded in a defamation
action are a punishment and a deterrent to wrongdoing rather than a
means to compensate the victim. 6 9 The court recognized that although
personal injury is a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages, a
plaintiff seeking punitive damages also must show that the defendant
acted egregiously.170 Therefore, the court found that facially it is not
clear whether punitive damages are awarded on account of a personal
injury.'7 ' Construing the underlying purpose of section 104(a)(2) as
solely to make the personal injury victim whole, the court concluded
that punitive damages, which are awarded in addition to any award of
compensatory damages, are beyond the section 104(a)(2) exclusion. 17 2
B. Legislative Amendment Limiting the Scope of the Personal
Injury Exclusion
In its search for additional revenue, Congress has amended section
104(a)(2) to limit strictly the exclusion of punitive damages from gross
income. Section 104 as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
164. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 339-40. Another argument for the exclusion of punitive damages is that they are
compensatory because they compensate the plaintiff for intangible harms, attorney's fees, and
costs. Id. at 341.
167. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
168. 914 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 1990).
169. See, e.g., Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 349, 539 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1988) (stating that
punitive damages are awarded "not as the measure of actual loss suffered but 'as punishment for
outrageous conduct and to deter future transgressions"' (quoting BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 352
(5th ed. 1979)). The Supreme Court adopted a similar position in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that punitive damages in a defamation action "are private fines ... to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence," not compensation for injury).





Act of 1989 provides that the section 104(a)(2) exclusion "shall not ap-
ply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving
physical injury or physical sickness."' 3 Although the Conference Com-
mittee Report does not offer an explanation for the change, 7 4 Congress
may have wished to resolve the conflict between the courts and the Ser-
vice on this issue.
The amended section represents a compromise between the respec-
tive positions of the Service and the courts. The Service's position has
been codified for punitive damages awarded for nonphysical personal
injuries. 75 Thus, in nonphysical injury actions, such as Miller v. Com-
missioner, the punitive damages awarded will be includable in gross in-
come. Taxation of punitive damages in nonphysical injury cases may
raise revenues significantly in light of the trend of large punitive dam-
age awards. 178 Section 104 as amended does not state that punitive
damages awarded in physical injury actions no longer will be excluded;
therefore, by implication punitive damages awarded in physical injury
actions will continue to qualify for exclusion under section 104(a)(2).
The courts previously had adopted this position, and this legislative
amendment to the Code allows for the result in Burford v. United
States.1
77
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE MODIFICATION
Although the amendment of section 104(a)(2) has resolved the
prior disparate treatment of punitive damages, other areas of conflict
and uncertainty remain. Recommendations for congressional action
with respect to section 104(a)(2) have been suggested. The House Ways
and Means Committee proposed an amendment to section 104(a)(2)
that would have excluded damages received on account of personal in-
juries or sickness in cases involving physical injury or physical sick-
173. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103
Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989). The provision is effective for punitive damages received after July 10,
1989, other than amounts received under a written agreement or court decree issued before July
10, 1989, or amounts received pursuant to suits filed on or before July 10, 1989.
174. HR. CoNp. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmYN. NEWS 1906, 3225-26.
175. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Service's position that
punitive damages are includable in gross income).
176. For the years 1976 to 1985, the average yearly increase in jury verdict awards was
15.23%. Chapman, supra note 147, at 424 n.154. For the period 1990 to 1994, tax revenues are
estimated to increase by $27 million as a result of the change. Joint Committee on Taxation Rep.
No. JCX-74-89 (Nov. 21, 1989), reprinted in Joint Committee Estimates Revenue Effects of Con-
ference Agreement on Revenue Provisions of Budget Reconciliation Acts, in TAx NoTEs TODAY
(Nov. 22, 1989).
177. For a discussion of Burford, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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ness.178 The House Committee believed that exclusion of damages was
inappropriate in cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness
and wished to stop the trend toward expansive judicial interpretation of
the types of damages that may be recovered on account of personal in-
juries .17 The House amendment would have eliminated, in nonphysical
injury cases, the tax incentive to allocate settlement or judgment pro-
ceeds to tort-type remedies and also would have eliminated the windfall
to personal injury plaintiffs through the exclusion of lost earnings, ex-
cept in cases in which the plaintiff had been physically injured.18 0 All
damages flowing from a physical injury or physical sickness would have
been excludable under section 104(a)(2).181
The House proposal would have magnified the inconsistent tax
consequences currently present in the personal injury area. For exam-
ple, a plaintiff suffering mostly from mental distress arising out of an
automobile accident in which the physical injury was slight could ex-
clude from gross income all damages received. Another plaintiff suffer-
ing mental distress resulting from racial slander would have to include
all damages received in gross income because there was no physical in-
jury. Although these plaintiffs essentially suffered the same injury, the
House proposal would create drastically different tax consequences.1 8 2
One commentator has suggested that section 104(a)(2) should ex-
clude damages only to the extent that they are a reimbursement for
actual expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of ser-
vices. 8 3 Under this proposal a court would consider the consequences of
the injury and limit exclusion to damages received on account of inju-
ries that are clearly personal and within the probable congressional in-
tent in retaining section 104(a)(2).184 Because this proposal does not
distinguish between physical and nonphysical injuries, the dichotomous
tax treatment in the above example would not occur. This definition of
the exclusion, however, will not remove the potential for abuse, espe-
cially when a plaintiff easily could argue a claim for emotional distress.
To remove all inequities and to prevent taxpayers from determin-
178. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 11641 (1989). Enactment of the House bill would
increase revenues by an estimated $42 million for the period 1990 to 1994. Joint Committee on
Taxation Rep. No. JCX-70-89 (Oct. 26, 1989), reprinted in JCT Releases Revenue Estimates for
House and Senate Revenue-Raising Provisions in Budget Reconciliation Bills, in TAx NoTEs To-
DAY (Oct. 27, 1989).
179. OMNMUS BUDGET RCONCILULTION ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
1354-55, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADndN. NEws 1906, 2824-25.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See ABA Comments, supra note 125.




ing their own tax status, Congress should repeal this exclusion. Repeal
of section 104(a)(2) would have the effect of including in gross income
all damages received on account of personal injury, unless the Code oth-
erwise excludes these damages. Damages received for noneconomic inju-
ries as well as economic injuries would be taxable and would ease the
burdens of a revenue-needy Congress. Taxing damages received in lieu
of lost earnings and profits would not be unfair to the taxpayer because
these earnings would have been taxed if the personal injury never had
occurred. 185 While the repeal of section 104(a)(2) would remove the
present windfall that exclusion of earnings has bestowed on personal
injury victims, steps can be taken to ensure that these taxpayers con-
tinue to receive full compensation.
Courts should instruct juries that damage awards will be subject to
federal income tax. This instruction would permit a jury to adjust an
award both to compensate the plaintiff for injuries and to account for
the tax liability that will occur. Taxing an award not based on lost earn-
ings will shift the tax liability to defendants, but current tort law policy
justifies an award that will return the plaintiff to the position the plain-
tiff would have been in absent the injury. Because damages received in
a personal injury suit would be taxed, an award for lost earnings should
be made on a gross earnings basis. The plaintiff will receive gross earn-
ings and pay tax on them and, thus, will be treated equitably with all
other taxpayers. A gross earnings award also will avoid the state courts'
concern that performing a calculation based on net earnings is beyond
the capacity of a jury.'86
Repeal of section 104(a)(2) would remove the tax-driven abuses of
this exclusion. Litigants no longer would have the incentive to color
both their claims and the presentation of evidence in hope of persuad-
ing the court that they had been personally injured. Repeal also would
remove the burden on courts to allocate jury awards or settlement
agreements between personal and nonpersonal injuries.1 87 At present
plaintiffs have an incentive to allocate settlements to tort-type injuries
in hope of excluding at least part of a settlement from gross income.1 88
Apart from removing taxpayer abuse, repeal of section 104(a)(2)
would assist in accomplishing the goals of the tort and tax systems. Ju-
ries, informed of the tax consequences of their awards, would fulfill the
185. See I.R.C. § 61 (1990).
186. See text accompanying note 94.
187. See Niles v. United States, 710 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that review of
IRS allocation of jury awards would be "bewildering" to courts).
188. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. For advice to the practitioner on how to
achieve excludability, see Barton, How to Make Your Damages in Employment Cases Excludable,
4 PRAc. TAx LAw. 57 (1989).
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tort system's goal of compensation. Equitable treatment of similarly sit-
uated taxpayers also would be achieved because all personal injury
damages would be taxed and the courts would not be compelled to draw
arbitrary lines to determine what types of injuries fall within the scope
of the personal injury award exclusion. 18 Should Congress repeal sec-
tion 104(a)(2), it could provide special treatment to tort victims in a
manner more closely related to the underlying tax principles of the
Code. For example, Congress could grant increased personal exemptions
to persons with objectively measurable disabilities.9 ' This approach
would be consistent with the present exemptions available to the blind
or elderly and would be available regardless of the cause of the disabil-
ity, thereby treating disabled persons equitably for tax purposes.1 91
V. CONCLUSION
Section 104(a)(2) provides an exclusion from gross income of com-
pensatory damages received on account of personal injury or sickness
and punitive damages in cases of physical injury or physical sickness.
The courts have interpreted expansively what constitutes a personal in-
jury and have brought within the scope of this section damages received
for economic injury. The Service has taken a position that treats tax-
payers inequitably and disputes the exclusion of economic damages
only in cases not involving a physical injury.
Although the congressional intent in enacting the predecessor of
section 104(a)(2) is unclear, legislative acquiescence to judicial expan-
sion of the exclusion suggests that sympathy for personal injury victims
may be the motive for retaining this favorable tax treatment. This ra-
tionale might justify exclusion of damages paid to compensate the tax-
payer for personal injuries such as pain and suffering and emotional
distress, but mere sympathy should not be allowed to legitimize inequi-
table treatment of taxpayers. Any future legislative action at a mini-
189. A loophole that would be closed by the repeal of § 104(a)(2) is the exclusion of the
interest component of a structured settlement or judgment. In a structured settlement, any de-
ferred payments are excludable from gross income, and no interest income is imputed to the tax-
payer. Conversely, when the taxpayer receives a lump-sum award and invests the proceeds, the
interest received clearly is includable in gross income. For a discussion of structured settlements,
see Blackburn, supra note 4, at 686.
190. See Burke & Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards:
The Need for Limits, 50 MoNT. L. REv. 13, 46 (1989).
191. Id. Burke and Friel have suggested another alternative that would not involve repeal of
§ 104(a)(2): narrowing the scope of § 104(a)(2) to make it consistent with § 104(a)(3) and § 105.
Analogizing a tort victim's damages to employer-provided insurance, damages received would be
includable in gross income except to the extent that they are attributable to amounts expended for
medical care, which would be similar to § 105(b), or to the extent that they are attributable to a
permanent disability or disfigurement, which is similar to § 105(c). This approach would retain the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion only for serious physical injuries. Id.
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mum should remove economic recovery from the scope of this
exemption because all taxpayers should be required to pay taxes on
their wages. Because Congress has clung to this exclusion notwithstand-
ing past opportunities for amendment and superficially would not wish
to appear unsympathetic to tort victims, repeal of section 104(a)(2) may
be unlikely. The courts, however, will view lack of legislative action as
approval of their expansive interpretation of the scope of section
104(a)(2).192
Taxpayer abuses of this exemption through careful presentation of
a claim remain unchecked under present law, and the potential for fu-
ture abuse increases as the courts continue to expand the scope of the
exclusion. To prevent further abuses, to achieve equitable treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers, and to raise revenues, Congress should
seize the initiative to repeal section 104(a)(2). The humanitarian benefit
presently extended to personal injury victims may be accomplished
without this exemption by ensuring through other means that they are
fully compensated for their injuries.
Susan Kim Matlow
•192. See Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990). In its interpretation of the
OBRA amendment the Court stated, "Congress chose to implicitly endorse the courts' expansive
interpretation of § 104(a)(2) to encompass nonphysical injuries and merely circumscribe the scope
of the exemption as to only one type of remedy, i.e., punitive damages, and not other types of
remedies typically available in employment discrimination cases, such as back pay." Id. The court
also stated, "'Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.'" Id. (quoting
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
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